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Abstract 
Before my combat deployments into Iraq, I, Colonel Wes Martin, had successfully fought another war. As 
a military police officer, I spent many years fighting against sexual misconduct, abuse of authority, and 
cover-ups within the senior officer and sergeant ranks in the United States Army. During this fight I faced 
continual criticism from my senior officers who claimed I was discrediting the Army by exposing the 
corrupt and immoral behavior of senior officers and sergeants. 
During the early days of standing up to the corruption, when I had the rank of Major, I received retaliatory 
evaluations and was forced to temporarily leave active duty. After successfully appealing and having the 
retaliatory evaluations removed from my records, I was determined no one should suffer the 
consequences of doing the harder right over the easier wrong. Teaming with military icon Colonel 
(Retired) David Hackworth and other officers determined to create a just system, I played a pivotal role in 
forcing reforms throughout the Army. While helping other victims of sexual harassment and abuse of 
authority I wrote three articles that found their way throughout the Army. 
During this same period, I progressed through four successful commands. In each of those commands I 
aggressively enforced his standards of “mutual respect” and “trust.” In formations and training I warned 
all subordinates of the consequences of involvement in sexual harassment, abuse of authority, and 
racism. Even though I firmly drew the line when assuming each of my commands, there was always at 
least one subordinate in each who crossed the line thinking he was immune from being held accountable. 
The result was an immediate end to the transgressions and all dedicated soldiers realizing they had a 
champion to protect them from abuse. 
The Army did change for the better and also commenced holding senior officers and sergeants 
accountable for their actions. Unfortunately, the continuing deployments into combat has had a negative 
effect on Army leadership. A lot of outstanding junior officers and sergeants left the ranks to build family-
oriented lives and civilian careers. Their departures have created vacancies and promotion opportunities 
for substandard performers. This has in turn resulted in a resurgence of misbehavior. The fortunate part 
is top Army leadership is no longer blatantly covering the corruption. 
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ABSTRACT 
Before my combat deployments into Iraq, I, Colonel Wes Martin, had successfully fought 
another war. As a military police officer, I spent many years fighting against sexual 
misconduct, abuse of authority, and cover-ups within the senior officer and sergeant ranks 
in the United States Army. During this fight I faced continual criticism from my senior 
officers who claimed I was discrediting the Army by exposing the corrupt and immoral 
behavior of senior officers and sergeants.  
During the early days of standing up to the corruption, when I had the rank of Major, I 
received retaliatory evaluations and was forced to temporarily leave active duty. After 
successfully appealing and having the retaliatory evaluations removed from my records, I 
was determined no one should suffer the consequences of doing the harder right over the 
easier wrong. Teaming with military icon Colonel (Retired) David Hackworth and other 
officers determined to create a just system, I played a pivotal role in forcing reforms 
throughout the Army. While helping other victims of sexual harassment and abuse of 
authority I wrote three articles that found their way throughout the Army. 
During this same period, I progressed through four successful commands. In each of those 
commands I aggressively enforced his standards of “mutual respect” and “trust.” In 
formations and training I warned all subordinates of the consequences of involvement in 
sexual harassment, abuse of authority, and racism. Even though I firmly drew the line when 
assuming each of my commands, there was always at least one subordinate in each who 
crossed the line thinking he was immune from being held accountable. The result was an 
immediate end to the transgressions and all dedicated soldiers realizing they had a 
champion to protect them from abuse.  
The Army did change for the better and also commenced holding senior officers and 
sergeants accountable for their actions. Unfortunately, the continuing deployments into 
combat has had a negative effect on Army leadership. A lot of outstanding junior officers 
and sergeants left the ranks to build family-oriented lives and civilian careers. Their 
departures have created vacancies and promotion opportunities for substandard 
performers. This has in turn resulted in a resurgence of misbehavior. The fortunate part is 
top Army leadership is no longer blatantly covering the corruption. 
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N THE EARLY 1990s, I, United States Army Major Wesley Martin, found myself 
in a broken environment where sexual misconduct and abuse of authority was 
an accepted and self-sustaining way of life. For having protected subordinates 
from a corrupt environment, I was drawn into a fight that exposed the seriousness 
and depth of an Army-wide problem. The efforts of my allies and I resulted in re-
forms that ranged from temporary to potentially permanent. Now retired from ac-
tive duty, I am witnessing the repeat of a disturbing history. The following is my 
account of combating sexual misconduct and abuse of authority among high-rank-
ing officers in the Army. 
I retired from active duty in 2010. During my rise from private to colonel I ac-
cumulated over 10 years of command time, including two battalions, one group, 
and one base. My combat tours include serving as the senior Antiterrorism/Force 
Protection Officer for all coalition forces in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom 1 
and 2, as senior coalition forces liaison officer with the United Nations, as Senior 
Operations Officer for Task Force 134 (Detention Operations), and as Commander 
of Forward Operating Base Ashraf (working with the Iranian Mujahedin). During 
my three Pentagon tours of duty I served as Force Protection Assessment Team 
Chief, Army Operations Center Crisis Action Team Chief, and Department of Army 
Information Operations Chief. I completed my military service as the U.S. Forces 
Korea (USFK) Information Operations Chief.  
As the Senior Antiterrorism Officer in Iraq, my “boots on the ground” and “al-
ways operate inside the enemy’s decision-making cycle” style of leadership re-
sulted in his blocking Al Qaeda from killing the moderate Shia Grand Ayatollah 
Sistani and blowing up the Baghdad doctors’ convention. I also prevented the theft 
of over 1000 Cobalt 60 radioactive sources and an attack on the Baghdad trade fair. 
As the USFK Information Operations Chief, I developed the Computer Network 
Operations oversight program that became the template for all U.S. Department of 
Defense major commands. I am also a retired Member of Technical Staff at De-
partment of Energy’s Sandia National Laboratories. While at Sandia I came 
through the ranks as a member of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) force, 
Protective Force Lieutenant, Operations Security Program Manager, and served as 
Operations Chief of the Laboratory’s Security Force. In my current work of ad-
dressing Middle-East and military issues I have appeared on numerous American, 
Canadian, and European national news programs and have articles published in 
numerous printed media venues throughout the United States. 
Recent Surge of Cases of Sexual Misconduct 
Warriors despise having to pay for the same real estate twice. Yet, that is exactly 
what is happening as proven by the recent surge of investigations and subsequent 
demotions of senior officers in the United States Army. 
The growing list already includes Major General Joseph Harrington for flirting 
with the wife of an enlisted soldier (Brook, 2018); Major General Wayne Grigsby 
for an inappropriate relationship with a captain on his staff (Myers, 2017; Witlock, 
2017), Major General David Haight for his swinging lifestyle (Brook, 2016; 
I 
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“General demoted after affair,” 2016), and Brigadier General Jeffrey Sinclair for a 
three-year affair with a subordinate (Zoroya, 2014). 
Then we have Lieutenant General Ron Lewis, a top aide to the Secretary of De-
fense, using a government credit card at strip clubs (Tan, 2017), while Brigadier 
General Bryan Roberts was busted after getting into a physical altercation at a so-
cial event with his mistress from an external affair (“Misconduct by armed forces’ 
generals,” 2017). These last two examples would be comical if not so pathetic. 
The aforementioned are only the general grade officers who have been exposed 
and held accountable for misconduct. It would be foolish to believe they are the 
only ones who have broken the trust expected of their positions. We have not seen 
the last of the scandals. There are more waiting to be exposed, and those exposed 
will always be a small fraction of what is happening inside a broken system. 
The only good news in these situations is that once-unwritten doctrine of cover-
up, specifically misbehavior of senior officers and senior enlisted, did not prevail. 
Twenty-five years ago, vicious cover-ups of corrupt behavior were the standard, 
usually conducted at the expense of the victims and those who fought for the moral 
right.  
While serving on the front line against sexual harassment and abuse of author-
ity in the 1990’s, in my role as a military police officer I took an aggressive stand 
against peers and seniors who used their positions for personal gain and pleasure. 
Rather than accepting the “rank has its privileges” or R.H.I.P. philosophy, my be-
lief was “with rank comes responsibilities and expectations.” One of these expecta-
tions is that loyalty between seniors and subordinates goes both ways.  
Into the Line of Fire 
What started as a local fight eventually had an impact on the entire Army. In 
September of 1990 I returned to active duty as an activated Army Reserve officer. 
The assignment was as a major and the deputy commander of a Reserve Officer 
Training Corps (ROTC) detachment of a northeastern university. Unfortunately, it 
turned out to be a very dysfunctional operation with a toxic commander. 
I came into this position with over a decade of active component time behind 
me. Previous assignments included reconnaissance duty inside the Korean DMZ, 
Military Police Officer in the Berlin Brigade, security inspector for Field Command 
Defense Nuclear Agency (FCDNA), and then 30 months of command time. From 
my enlisted and commissioned service, having worked closely with all four 
branches of the U.S. military and numerous foreign militaries, the words duty, 
honor, and country had developed a very special meaning to me. At this ROTC de-
tachment, I was working with people to whom those words meant nothing.  
Cadet Command’s False Claim of “Leadership and Excellence”  
At the time I was assigned to Cadet Command it had no business containing 
the words “Leadership and Excellence” on its insignia. Typically, in the 1990s, the 
heads of U.S. Army Cadet Command’s ROTC detachments were lieutenant colonels 
the Army had determined to be substandard performers. Being offered the means 
to retire from undistinguished careers, they were sent to these detachments for 
their twilight tours with the expectation to achieve the four “gets”: get transition 
education; get a permanent home; get a civilian job; and get out. In terms a 
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hardened combat warrior would appreciate, “Cadet Command was serving as the 
Army’s septic system.” 
Previous assignments in the U.S. Army had exposed me to military ethics at its 
highest and lowest points. Following a high-profile assignment as a member of In-
spections Directorate, Field Command Department of Defense Nuclear Agency, I 
transferred into a command that had torn itself apart by blatant and overwhelming 
sexual misconduct and abuse of authority on the part of senior officers and ser-
geants. Even as a captain I was subsequently able to change that environment by 
accepting command of the headquarters company which oversaw daily adminis-
trative responsibility of the command, including the senior officers assigned to it. 
This was a combination of developing and enforcing policies that included sexual 
harassment and fraternization. Unfortunately, those successes provided me the il-
lusion that pointed in the right direction, even the behavior of senior officers could 
be moderated. There was no moderating the despicable behavior of the lieutenant 
colonel who been trusted to command this isolated ROTC detachment. 
This individual was by far the most unprofessional officer I have ever wit-
nessed, including Iraqi officers. He severely lacked every professional character 
trait expected of a leader. Never-ending lying, continuous temper tantrums, and 
frequent throwing of objects at subordinates were part of his typical behavior. As 
the deputy commander, I spent a lot of time protecting everyone from him as well 
as protecting him from everyone else, including himself. The adage “no good deed 
goes unpunished” was very much a reality.  
To deal with this lieutenant colonel the command’s secretary, Vivian Reithmil-
ler, once noted I needed a degree in abnormal psychology. One day, two hours after 
pounding his own head into a door frame, this lieutenant colonel was prancing 
down the corridor singing “Zippidy Do Dah.” The only relief we got from his child-
ish behavior was when he was developing yet another conniving scheme. One of 
the most blatant, of which he was finally successful even after I warned the finance 
officer what was really happening, this lieutenant colonel was able to have the 
Army pay for his civilian conducted elective surgery fertility operation by claiming 
it was a cancer preventing procedure. 
Another of his never-ending antics involved severely upgrading the interview 
results of a very attractive female high school senior applying for a full Army col-
lege scholarship. That female was no more impressive than a young male who came 
in the same day but was rated significantly lower. As Vivian had attended both in-
terviews I asked her what happened. Vivian replied that although the young man 
had a better interview, the young women won the day because the lieutenant colo-
nel was blatantly infatuated. 
There is a good reason the Army periodically conducts Reduction in Force 
(RIF) purges. Unfortunately, for 20 years this had not happened and a lot of prob-
lem individuals slid through the system and into senior positions. During the Pres-
ident Reagan and Bush years, the military was expanded and unless someone had 
been convicted of a serious crime the likelihood of an officer being promoted to at 
least lieutenant colonel was very much assured.  
This lieutenant colonel was not the only resident issue. The next-most serious 
problem was an activated National Guard major who was making a sport of having 
as many sexual relationships as possible, including with cadets. Not to be outdone 
was a captain who was blatantly having an affair with two cadets at the same time. 
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This captain made sure everyone knew that he graduated from West Point, but 
despite his best efforts was not able to hide the fact it took him five years to come 
out at the bottom of his class – the goat.  
The colonels and generals assigned over these problem officers were just as 
substandard; however, it took the Army longer to realize it. When the light finally 
dawned, they too were sent to Cadet Command. The colonel assigned to serve as 
brigade commander had tried to commit suicide twice when he was a major be-
cause of his inability to handle stress. One attempt followed his being verbally rep-
rimanded by his battalion commander for the unit’s dysfunctional vehicle mainte-
nance program. 
The brigadier general had been returned from Germany, removed from his po-
sition as Deputy 1st Armored Division Commander. Already on marriage number 
three, his continual indiscretions in the local German village resulted in his being 
moved stateside before the command deployed for Desert Storm. Neither the weak 
colonel nor problematic general were held properly accountable, including in their 
evaluation reports. Both were allowed to continue contributing to a growing prob-
lem throughout the Army. 
That was the command climate in which I found myself having to protect staff 
and cadets from abuse and exploitation. Some of the females accepted the exploi-
tation in exchange for preferential treatment, to which other members of the staff, 
cadets, parents of the cadets, and university administrators were not blind. Yet 
nothing was done, especially by the colonel and general who wished to protect their 
careers by denying such serious problems existed on their watch.  
For having stood up against the sexual misconduct, the abuse of authority, and 
the countless other violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in this com-
mand environment, I might as well come to work every day with a target on my 
chest. I was a threat to their incompetent and corrupt way of life. Unlike the motion 
picture “Mr. Smith Goes to Washington” (1939, Columbia Studios) the bad element 
does not suddenly roll over and admit their shortfalls. They will come after their 
threat with every means possible, including using the very system they are abusing 
against the whistleblower. For me retaliation was a continual saga. 
Repositioning for the Continuing Fight  
Knowing I was not going to see justice while assigned to this detachment, in 
September of 1992 I returned to my civilian job and simultaneously accepted a po-
sition as commander of the Headquarters Detachment, 469th Quartermaster 
Group, U.S. Army Reserve. I vowed that I would do everything possible to ensure 
no one else would have to endure what I did for protecting subordinates from 
abuse and standing up for the truth. In this effort, I was putting a military applica-
tion to the statement New York City Police Officer Frank Serpico gave before the 
Knapp Commission in 1971: “We must create an environment where the dishonest 
officer fears the honest one, not the other way around.”  
My first order of personal business, concurrent with my Army command and 
civilian job responsibilities, was to clean up my records from the retaliatory reports 
submitted by these self-protecting ROTC seniors. On January 1, 1994 I submitted 
the evaluation report to the Appeal’s Branch of the Army Personnel Command. 
Eighty pages of witness statements within this 200-page evaluation appeal were 
critical to my vindication. On October 31, 1994 the notification of the evaluation’s 
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revocation was published. Even before receiving the document by mail, I knew the 
results. A member of the Appeal’s Office had already telephoned me with appreci-
ation for having stood the fight against corruption and extending his respect for 
the outstanding document submitted to clean up my records. 
In the next order of business, I started reaching out to senior Army leaders to 
expose the seriousness of problems within the Army and get them involved in cor-
recting the problem they owned. One of the first people contacted was Inspector 
General of the Army, Lieutenant General Ronald Griffiths. He was no solution; 
never even acknowledged my official requests for involvement. Congressional in-
quiries always resulted in responses stating more time was needed to investigate. 
A friend of mine who had worked in the Congressional Liaison Office told me that 
this is a standard stalling tactic. As my friend predicted, I never received any replies 
or follow-up action.  
I then locked in on one person making a difference – retired Colonel David 
Hackworth, or “Hack." From his days in Korea and Vietnam, “Hack” had earned 
over a hundred awards, to include 10 silver stars and eight purple hearts. Because 
he spoke out about the failed strategy of the then ongoing war in Vietnam, Hack 
was vilified by Army leadership.  
Warriors do not go down easily, and Hack was a total warrior. After forced re-
tirement from the Army, Hack wrote the best seller “About Face” (Hackworth & 
Sherman, 1990). By the time Desert Storm occurred, Hack was an ace military re-
porter and military icon. Seeing Hack’s articles and television interviews address-
ing problems inside the Army ranks, I realized we were both saying the same things 
about a broken system. The difference was Hack was being heard. I reached out to 
Hack and provided him documentation of what I had endured and how I had been 
unsuccessfully attempting to fix a broken system.  
Just as in years earlier when he had been mentored by the Army’s top historian, 
Brigadier General Sam (S.L.A.) Marshall, I became Hack’s protégé. By having al-
ready read many of Marshall’s books (1947) and articles I had been greatly influ-
enced by his style.  
Now I was studying Hack’s methodology as he was developing thoughts into 
published products. Hack liked to build his argument and test its ability to stand 
before he wrote. 
The results of many discussions between Hackworth and I could be seen in his 
articles. This was not a one-way street. Those discussions also surfaced in my writ-
ings, including a progressive trilogy consisting of “In Search of Accountability” 
(1998), “Plan On Blowing A Whistle, Here’s What You Have To Look Forward To” 
(1997) and “Don’t Give Up the Ship” (1998). Following Sam’s legacy, I also contin-
ued to document the lessons of history. However, it was Hack’s legacy of fighting 
corruption and abuse of authority that dominated my focus. 
Hack was also in contact with then-Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer. 
When Reimer was a young lieutenant, he had been in the same battalion as then-
Major Hackworth. The two got along very well and remained friends through the 
years. Hack provided Reimer my documentation concerning Cadet Command and 
recommended the Chief have someone meet with me to discuss the seriousness of 
the Army’s abuse of authority problem. Like Army Inspector General Griffith, 
Reimer did nothing. Had either of them tried to reach out and fix the problems, I 
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likely would not have been involved in exposing serious problems that soon landed 
in each of their offices.  
CHALLENGING A BROKEN SYSTEM 
In this section, I discuss the details that forced the entire United States Army 
to admit the existence of serious problems and the need to develop reforms. I was 
a Lieutenant Colonel throughout this campaign and it was no secret that senior 
commanders disapproved of my involvement in the fight for justice and integrity 
over the concept of “rank has its privileges.”  
During May, 1996, the depth of abuse of authority and sexual misconduct prob-
lems started coming to a head from what should have been a most unlikely source. 
Basic training drill sergeants are expected to be role-models. At Aberdeen Army 
Base the revelation was starting to unfold that drill sergeants were making a sport 
out of how many attractive female recruits they could entice into sexual relation-
ships.  
To the credit of the Aberdeen situation, once Major General (MG) Robert Shad-
ley learned of the problem within his command, he took all the right actions (“Ju-
dicial Proceedings Panel Remarks from Major General Robert D. Shadley,” 2015). 
MG Shadley immediately engaged the Army Criminal Investigation Command, set 
up telephone hotlines, took proper action to protect victims, and removed the 
threat of retaliation from all soldiers who came forward. If every general in the 
Army possessed MG Shadley’s ethics and determination to get involved when a 
problem was exposed, there never would have been the Army-wide meltdown that 
was about to occur. Unfortunately, MG Shadley’s commitment to properly fulfill 
his responsibilities did not generate the same response up the chain of command. 
A great warrior was out front, without proper support from his seniors. MG Shad-
ley later documented the entire situation in his book titled, The GAMe, Unraveling 
a Military Sex Scandal (2013). This book should be required reading for all officers 
and sergeants.  
With people now coming forward throughout the Army, it was soon learned 
the problems of abuse of authority and sexual misconduct were widespread. Even 
General Reimer started using the term “cancers” when describing the people cre-
ating the problems. I had been using that term for years, to include in documents 
Hackworth provided to Reimer. It is not important whether or not Reimer had 
picked up this term from my documents or selected this word on his own; the bot-
tom line is that was the term he used to accurately describe the people who were 
creating the problems. From his office, Reimer was stating the right things, but he 
failed to wade into the battle. Reimer was no Omar Bradley, the World War II “Sol-
diers General” who led from the front in Europe and later served as Army Chief of 
Staff. 
Establishment of Secretary of Army’s Special Task Force  
To address the problems now being exposed, in the autumn of 1996 Secretary 
of the Army Togo West established a special task force to examine the depth of the 
problem and to recommend solutions. Ironically, Sergeant Major of the Army Gene 
McKinney, the Army’s and Reimer’s top sergeant, was assigned to this task force 
as spokesman for the enlisted soldiers. Women soon came forward stating McKin-
ney had sexually harassed them (Gross, 1998). The first to come forward was Ser-
geant Major Brenda Hoster, McKinney’s former Chief of Public Relations 
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(Graham, 1997). From personal experience, I knew what Brenda was about to en-
dure. Sending her an appreciation letter, which included Hack’s message to Gen-
eral Reimer concerning my fight, I offered Brenda support. She accepted.  
Meanwhile, inside the Pentagon a well-placed general officer was passing on to 
Hackworth critical information about McKinney’s demeaning strategy concerning 
Brenda Hoster. The strategy was meant to be used on an unsuspecting Hoster and 
knock her off balance at the Article 32 hearing. The judge possibly would have 
tossed the information out, but the negative effect on Hoster would have been 
achieved. The Article 32 hearing, which best translates in civilian terms to a grand 
jury, was not intended to recommend a court-martial. Hack provided the infor-
mation to me, with instructions to pass it on to Brenda.  
Armed with the information I had provided, Hoster had an outstanding inter-
view with Forrest Sawyer on “Nightline” (Sawyer, 1997, July 29). Next morning her 
interview on “Good Morning America” (Chung, 1998) was equally superlative. 
These interviews resulted in an immediate one-day suspension of the Article 32 
hearing. The following day the hearing re-commenced and the final recommenda-
tion was to proceed with a court-martial for Sergeant Major of the Army McKinney.  
Throughout the entire process, I stayed in contact with Brenda, provided moral 
support, wrote articles on her behalf, and presented her with a Revolutionary War 
“Don’t Tread on Me” flag. Brenda was in fact serving point on a revolution, one 
against sexual harassment being an accepted and protected way of life in the Army. 
Unfortunately, the first battle of most revolutions results in defeat and this fight 
was to be no exception.  
To McKinney’s credit, he had hired the very skilled military defense attorney 
Charles Gittins. A former Marine Corps lieutenant colonel and legal officer, U.S. 
Navy Academy graduate Gittins knew more about military law than any of the 
other attorneys ever to be involved in this case, to seemingly include the judge.  
For five weeks the trial progressed, or regressed, depending on one’s viewpoint. 
A telling sign of what was going on behind the scenes came with one juror wanting 
to be discharged from responsibilities because of the stress. The verdict was read 
on March 13, 1998: McKinney was found guilty of obstructing justice and cleared 
of 18 other charges (“McKinney sentencing phase under way,” March, 1998). The 
presiding military judge then took it upon himself to call the accusers to the stand 
and reprimand them. Usually it is the role of the defense attorney to degrade the 
victims and produce doubt of credibility to the jury, which was achieved. This time 
the judge also wanted to get his personal attacks in. The culture of protecting sen-
iors was very much in play. 
The verdict was read on a Friday, the day I had arrived in Dallas for an Army 
Reserve conference. I already had a Sunday morning breakfast scheduled with re-
tired Army Colonel John Pitchford, who lived in the greater Dallas area. John was 
a friend of Hack’s, a fellow survivor of exposing corruption in the Army, and some-
one who had read my article “Plan on Blowing a Whistle” (1997) in Hackworth’s 
Defending America weekly e-mail posting. Over breakfast, I vented hard to John 
about the McKinney verdict. After breakfast, I went back to the conference. John 
went home and wrote an article about the Army’s breakdown of accountability and 
discipline, which was immediately published in USA Today (1998). John was then 
contacted by Donnamarie Carpino. A whole new fight against a corrupt system was 
on. 
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Exposing Corruption in General Officer Ranks 
Donnamarie Carpino has been married to a colonel serving in Turkey under 
the command of Major General David Hale. To Carpino, Hale had claimed to have 
evidence that her husband was having an affair. Hale informed Carpino that if she 
would become his mistress, her husband would be protected. Carpino later learned 
her husband never had an affair. Unfortunately, her affair with Hale resulted in a 
Carpino’s marriage ending up in divorce. Meanwhile, Hale went on to become Dep-
uty Inspector General of the Army.  
Once this incident was brought to the attention of the Army’s Criminal Inves-
tigation Command (CID) a thorough inquiry commenced. However, this effort was 
cut short by Army Chief of Staff General Reimer who, against regulations, had al-
lowed Hale to retire while being a subject of an investigation.  
Days after our breakfast meeting, Pitchford called me and asked the name of 
Hoster’s attorney. He explained that he was now helping Carpino. I told him the 
attorney was Susan Barnes of Denver and assured John she was one of the very 
best lawyers to be found. Carpino had been using the same Charles Gittins who 
was McKinney’s attorney.  
My original intent was to support Pitchford’s effort of exposing Major General 
David Hale’s antics and lack of accountability. Hackworth instructed me to pull 
back, explaining Hale possessed derogatory information about Hack’s main source 
inside the Pentagon. If it came out I was involved in going after Hale, that would 
lead right back to Hack, and access to his source would be jeopardized. Assuring 
me Pitchford would get the job done without my involvement, Hack stated, “Pitch 
has the grip of a bulldog; once he locks on he does not let go. He will take Hale.” 
Agreeing that we had lots of other fights ahead of us, I accepted Hack’s instruc-
tions. 
With Pitchford on the attack against Hale and the subsequent cover-up, the 
Army was forced to call Hale back onto active duty and the investigation into his 
behavior recommenced. Twice, the Army assigned general officer friends of Hale 
to head the investigative process. Pitchford started probes on both generals. The 
result was the first general unexpectedly retired within days of Pitchford initiating 
the probe. The case was then assigned to the second. Almost immediately Pitchford 
alerted the world to ethical and conflict of interest problems concerning this gen-
eral.  
Army leadership then assigned Lieutenant General George Crocker, a dedi-
cated general officer who can be best characterized as “Mister Clean” to preside 
over the case against Hale. The result was Hale being court-martialed, convicted, 
and reduced one rank (Whitlock, 2017). With the Hale conviction, Army leadership 
was no longer able to deny and cover-up the existence of serious problems.  
Fight on the Broader Front 
Meanwhile, as John Pitchford was pushing forward with the Hale situation, 
through Hackworth’s 27,000 recipients e-mail newsletter, I released the article “In 
Search of Accountability” on March 28, 1998. The article laid the blame for its on-
going scandals right in the lap of senior Army leadership. Reimer, one of Hack's 
27,000 newsletter recipients, immediately contacted Hack and inquired as to the 
nature of my hostility. When Hack brought this to my attention, I responded that 
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Reimer should have listened to me the first time around when he was provided the 
appeal packet that exposed massive corruption within Cadet Command.  
As a result of the Aberdeen, McKinney, and Hale situations, throughout the 
U.S. Army, soldiers with complaints were coming forward to report sexual miscon-
duct and abuse of authority on the part of their seniors. Years later someone who 
was working with Reimer at the time informed me that every day the general came 
to work a scandal was waiting to be addressed. We were not letting up on the pres-
sure. As mentioned, we previously had tried to work with the Army command 
structure and were ignored. Inspector General of the Army Lieutenant General 
Griffiths failed to get involved. Congressional inquiries were blown off. Now we 
were using the media and having an impact.  
For a year Hack and I kept the media pressure on the U.S. Army. When allied 
bombing of Yugoslavia commenced on March 24, 1999 a unity of effort was neces-
sary. Our intent was to pick up the fight when hostilities were over. Meanwhile, the 
Army took advantage of the reprieve to introduce corrective actions. Two pro-
grams, “Consideration of Others” and “Army Values,” were developed. All soldiers 
were required to participate in the training. Soldiers were also issued and required 
to have on their possession at all times cards that explained the Army Values of 
loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage.  
While the introduction of “Consideration of Others” and “Army Values” was 
nice and a step in the right direction, there was nothing in either program that was 
not already covered in the application of basic leadership principles. In short, the 
Army went through corrective action training because of a broken command struc-
ture that went all the way from private to the Army Chief of Staff. 
Disapproval of Senior Officers and Military Community  
Meanwhile, my actions for justice and accountability were noticed in a very 
negative way. Seniors in my chain of command and members of military-affiliated 
organizations of which I was a member informed me I was “bringing discredit to 
the Army.” Their feeling was that I should have been helping the Army mitigate the 
bad publicity, not exposing problems. In short, their opinion was I should have 
been supporting Army seniors, not their accusers.  
This attitude validated the seriousness of a broken system. My stand was that 
the people conducting sexual harassment and abuse of authority were the ones dis-
crediting the system, not the people who stood against corruption. Furthermore, I 
have never figured out why we should expect subordinates to risk their lives in a 
field of fire if their seniors will not fight for their well-being. Loyalty works both 
ways. The West Point prayer calls for “the harder right over the easier wrong.” 
Fighting for justice and integrity in a broken system is about as right as it gets.  
Verbally stating displeasure was as far as my chain of command dared to take 
themselves. There were three reasons further retaliation did not occur. The first 
was they knew I was right and they had no desire to get themselves into an Army-
wide fight. The second was fear of Hackworth and fulfilling Japanese Admiral 
Yamamoto’s December 7, 1941 expressed concern for “waking the sleeping giant 
and leave him with a terrible resolve.” The third reason was the continuing success 
of units I was being called in to command. By the time I retired, I had accumulated 
123 months of command time, to include combat. Of my six commands, only one 
did not involve my going in to clean up a dysfunctional operation.  
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MAKING AN IMPACT 
While fighting against corruption throughout the entire United States Army, 
I was also standing firm against sexual misconduct and abuse of authority in my 
own commands. In this section, I examine the concepts of professional leadership 
and how I used it to protect the victims of abuse while holding the perpetrators 
accountable. I also was able to personally witness the positive impact of the long-
term fight for accountability, and that finally the Army’s top leadership came to 
share his views.  
Dedication to justice was not just a fight I was involved in directed at the senior 
level. It was at the forefront in every one of my units. Hackworth told me the only 
lives you can be guaranteed to affect positively on a continual and permanent basis 
are those of the people assigned to your commands. Other efforts are random 
shots.  
During the 1995 to 2002-time frame, while progressively commanding two bat-
talions and one group, I developed a list of “kill zones.” All subordinates were ad-
vised by me that entering into any of them would result in my direct engagement. 
The term “kill zones” was used to ensure no doubt existed regarding my serious-
ness in enforcing them. The irony of publicly announcing my “kill zones” was that 
I was doing it while the Clinton Administration was trying to move the United 
States military to a kinder, gentler force composed of people in touch with their 
emotions.  
When coming into all my leadership positions since the mid-90s, upfront I al-
ways announced those zones before my troops. I also assured them during these 
briefings that someone in attendance would be offended and feel threatened by my 
comments, specifically the culprits of the standards I was enforcing. In 2003, I 
even had an Inspector General complaint filed against me because the term “kill 
zones” was intimidating. It was, but not to the dedicated soldiers living up to “Army 
Values.” The Inspector General’s determination was in my favor with the acknowl-
edgement his life would be easier if more commanders would take such an aggres-
sive stand.  
The six forbidden zones were: racism; sexual misconduct; alcohol on duty/ille-
gal drugs anytime; loss of a firearm; blatant safety violation which could result in 
loss of life or limb; and use authority for personal interest or pleasure. All soldiers 
were advised up front that victims would be placed on the sideline and the fight 
would be between the perpetrator(s) and myself. In all my commands, the goal was 
to build an environment based upon mutual respect and trust. It was made clear I 
would take undermining of that goal as a personal matter. Everyone heard the 
warning, and dedicated soldiers appreciated the message.  
Using the “Be, Know, Do” concept, subordinates were further informed if they 
tried to do the right thing, but it went wrong because of lack of knowledge, or the 
“Do” just did not turn out right, despite the best of intentions, we could deal with 
it. However, if the problem resulted from problematic inner character of the per-
son, the “Be” element of that triad, then they would be held accountable  
Accountability Enforced 
There was usually one senior person in each command who did not take the 
warning seriously. The most blatant was in the first battalion I commanded from 
September 1996 to January 2000. This command, the 95th Division Signal 
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Battalion, was headquartered in Albuquerque, New Mexico, with subordinate op-
erations stretching to Louisiana, Iowa, Nebraska, and all states between. My num-
ber two sergeant proved himself to be a racist, alcoholic, and a sexual predator. 
From his peers and previous superiors, I found out he had been doing these antics 
for two decades. When I asked the previous seniors why they did nothing about it, 
the response was always the same: “I did not personally see it.” That is no excuse.  
Unless the perpetrator is totally stupid, or the command environment allows 
it, wrongful antics are not going to be carried out in front of seniors. When prob-
lems are reported to seniors, they are then the owners of the problem. Avoiding 
confrontations, while providing problem individuals glowing performance evalua-
tions, is not a solution. As for this senior sergeant, he did not survive me. He left 
the Army with one less rank, and his blazing close-out performance evaluation for-
ever documenting his antics.  
As a result of this sergeant finally being held accountable and removed from 
the ranks, the morale of the command skyrocketed, especially among the minori-
ties and females. However, one sad long-term reality was exposed in the process: 
only white male sergeants came forward to provide statements as I proceeded 
against this individual. The reason was that the minorities had filed reports in the 
past. The only thing these previous complaints had accomplished was to bring 
wrath down on the people who told the truth. The minorities thought history was 
only going to repeat itself, at their expenses. 
Continuing the Fight 
Assignment of my second battalion command came quickly. As Deputy Com-
mander of the 647th Area Support Group (Army Reserve), in June of 2000 I was 
called into the commander’s office. Colonel Mark Widmer’s message was pretty 
basic. “I have an additional duty for you. Go take command of the 372nd and do 
something with that officer corps.” The lieutenant colonel battalion commander 
being relieved had taken the troops to the desert for eight days, but he and his three 
senior officers left the field and went back to their homes for the middle four days, 
while still on the Army payroll.  
In my taking command of this battalion, with Hackworth in attendance, the 
command environment was so bad the previous commander had been told not to 
show up for the ceremony. I received the colors from the captain who had stayed 
with the troops in the field. My first order of business was to remove the lounge 
environment from my newly inherited battalion commander’s office. My second 
order of business was to forbid future officer meetings at Hooter’s Restaurants and 
strip bars.  
One day, while working in my office, Chief Warrant Officer Jim Terrazas of a 
subordinate unit walked into my office and stated, “We have to talk!” Jim, an out-
standing soldier I had known for years, told me about an incident that happened 
prior to my arrival. While on two weeks annual training, a senior sergeant had ma-
nipulated a young female soldier into driving him to a lakeside. While both were 
outside the vehicle looking at this “scenic location” the sergeant came up behind 
the soldier, put his arms around her and commenced kissing her neck. The soldier 
pushed the sergeant away and both returned to camp. When confronted, the ser-
geant admitted to the captain what he had done. The captain’s only action was to 
respond, “I wish you had not done that.” Now, a year later, the captain had sub-
mitted a promotion packet on the sergeant.  
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I immediately interviewed the soldier, with Chief Terrazas and Lieutenant (and 
registered nurse) Rebecca Eisler as witnesses. The victim’s story was firm. With an 
immediate telephone call, I had the sergeant’s packet removed from the promotion 
board, which was meeting that same weekend. I then contacted my group com-
mander, Colonel Mark Widmer’s replacement, and requested an external investi-
gation. Instead I was instructed to, “Just transfer the sergeant to another unit.” 
Refusing to let this sergeant escape accountability, I contacted 90th Regional Sup-
port Command Human Relations Office and requested an investigation. In turn, I 
was informed that would be too much work. Trying to maintain loyalty to my com-
mander, I recognized the end result would be putting him on report if I brought 
this matter to the Inspector General. The first question would be, “Did you talk to 
your commander?”  
Evaluating the pros and cons of further options, I informed the violating ser-
geant either that he would immediately retire or I would press for a court-martial. 
Unaware I was receiving no top cover, the sergeant accepted immediate retire-
ment. As for my colonel who wished to do nothing, six months later I received a 
telephone call from the commanding general, instructing me to take command of 
the group headquarters as he had fired that same colonel for inefficiency.  
One excuse I frequently heard from people who did not take my warnings seri-
ously was “All commanders claim zero tolerance, but no one ever enforces it.” This 
comment was a double dose of pathetic. First, no one should expect to be able to 
commit a wrong, especially a violation by another, because they believe they will 
not be held accountable. The second reason for this being such a pathetic comment 
is this was a very true statement. I never had a moral problem creating an environ-
ment where the dishonest fear the honest, just a problem with the majority of my 
peers and seniors not having the same commitment. Their sharing a professional 
commitment would have made my job easier and improved the lives of all affected 
subordinates.  
The Active Component Finally Learns the Meaning of Accountability 
On the active component front, two things that really made the difference were 
downsizing and the reintroduction of a long-lost concept – accountability. A mas-
sive number of substandard officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) left 
the Army in the late-90s, both voluntarily and involuntarily. As a result, the Army’s 
average of ethical standards among its leadership was perhaps the highest level 
ever experienced.  
For years I was not sure of the extent of our work. The answer came during a 
series of active duty tours between 2003 and 2010. In August of 2005, while serving 
on the Pentagon’s Army Operations Center (OAC) Crisis Action Team (CAT), we 
were about to commence the morning briefing to numerous one, two, and three-
star generals when Major Jim Bevens called out, “Stand By!” That meant a four-
star general, either the Chief or Vice Chief of Staff, had stepped onto the floor. It 
was the Vice, General Richard Cody. 
Walking to the front of his subordinates General Cody stated, “Yesterday, the 
Chief and I fired General Brynes. If you do not know why we fired him, you do not 
have a need to know. But I will tell you this…”. General Cody made it clear that 
ethics and standards were being enforced at all levels. If anyone else was discov-
ered crossing the line, they too would be held accountable. General Brynes had 
been the four-star Commander of Training and Doctrine Command. Brynes had 
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been willfully involved in an extra-marital affair and ignored warnings to cease and 
desist. Listening to General Cody “reading the riot act” to his subordinates I said 
to myself, “We won, we won.”  
EXAMINING THE BATTLEFIELD 
In this section, I revisit the fight for justice and accountability in the United 
States Army. While recognizing what successes achieved, I also acknowledge fail-
ures of certain components within the Army to fully integrate the reforms, the 
dangers of losing great soldiers and future leaders if self-serving individuals are 
allowed to destroy the lives of subordinates, and the need to always be vigilant 
against corruption and abuse of authority.  
The corrective actions and change of culture that were taking place in the active 
component did not resonate in the reserve forces. Reservists did all the required 
training, but the good-old-boy culture and long-term relationships that permeated 
the system were not going to change easily. The best example was the abuse at Abu 
Ghraib Detention Facility in Iraq. This facility was almost completely operated by 
Army Reserve Forces.  
Abu Ghraib Scandal  
In October of 2003, I warned Brigadier General Jan Karpinski, a former 1977 
Officer Basic Course classmate, that she had a total lack of adult supervision at Abu 
Ghraib. I had just completed a force protection assessment of the facility where 
military professionalism was non-existent. There was no real command operation 
at Abu Ghraib, just a poorly supervised gaggle. Three months later Jan telephoned 
me and asked for a meeting. The now infamous photographs revealed the com-
mand environment at Abu Ghraib was far more serious than either of us could have 
imagined (Hersh, 2004; Mersh, 2004; Nasr, 2009). Every one of the photographs 
verified how much the perpetrators were enjoying themselves. Furthermore, jun-
ior soldiers were leading seniors in a massive violation of human dignity. The wide-
spread problems at Abu Ghraib would not have happened with active duty soldiers 
in 2003.  
In 2004 I was the Headquarters, Department of the Army, Crisis Action Team 
Chief to first receive the report of the senior Army Reserve sergeants hosting mud-
wrestling competition among their female soldiers at the Bucca Detention Facility 
in Iraq. The report and photographs came not from the Army, but from the media 
which was in the process of going public. I had to inform senior Army leadership 
of this situation. First to be briefed was Brigadier General Doug Robinson who said 
it best. “Every time something like this happens, it is with Helmly’s troops.” Lieu-
tenant General James Helmly was then Chief of the Army Reserve.  
Unfortunately, even the clean-up of the active component did not last. The con-
tinuous deployments hit military families hard, resulting in a massive number of 
outstanding junior officers and enlisted soldiers leaving the ranks. The truth of the 
matter is Bush 43 had no legal justification to send us into Iraq and, in doing so, 
his trust in Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld was seriously misplaced. Had the 
380,000 soldiers called for in the then-classified invasion plan been deployed, in-
stead of the 140,000 identified by Rumsfeld, Iraq could have been stabilized.  
Because too many good soldiers left the ranks, vacancies were available for peo-
ple who never should have been retained. This was no surprise. In 2006, Major 
14




General Jack Gardner and I discussed what was coming. Gardner remains one of 
the most ethical and professional officers I have ever had the pleasure of knowing. 
Assessing the long-term situation, Gardner stated that unless someone gets caught 
committing a felony the chances of making lieutenant colonel or senior sergeant 
are pretty certain. He was right. Almost everything fought and gained in the 1990s 
is gone. The ethical standards being practiced in the field have gone down. As a 
result, the overall culture has deteriorated. 
This is fed by another core problem of the 1990s which has resurfaced. It can 
be argued the problem never went away, but it just did not have as much of an 
impact when the overall quality of the senior ranks was higher. In the mid-90s 
Hackworth published an article titled “Evaluations Encourage Corruption at All 
Levels” (1996). The main point of that article was Army performance evaluations 
of officers and sergeants were cluttered with flowery terms while failing to address 
incompetence and character problems. Hack was right, as borne out by the ROTC 
chain of command I endured and the scandals that overwhelmed the Army.  
Rather than hold someone accountable, especially on performance evalua-
tions, raters seem to believe it is easier to provide a glowing evaluation and pass 
the problem individual on to the next supervisor. That is exactly what happened 
with the racist, alcoholic, sexual predator sergeant I took down. Problem soldiers 
are not going to clean themselves up. They have no reason to do so because for 
years their antics have been tolerated. Meanwhile they drive other good people 
from the ranks, allowing yet more vacancies for substandard performers and prob-
lematic people. 
Whistleblower Retaliation 
One area still needing to be fixed is holding seniors accountable for slander-
ridden cover-ups against subordinates who stand for the truth. Too frequently the 
mechanisms for reporting misbehavior of seniors are used as information detec-
tion systems. The goal of pre-emptive slandering is to discredit the subordinate, or 
at least to “age the problem.” Usually it takes months and years for the whistle-
blower to disprove the slanderous attacks, especially if seniors two or three levels 
above join in the cover-up to protect themselves from accountability for allowing 
the dysfunctional environment to exist in the first place. Being that accountability 
for pre-emptive attacking of the whistle-blower is never conducted, there is no in-
centive for the violators not to resort to never-ending method of self-preservation. 
My experience with Cadet Command is an excellent testimonial to this fact.  
Extremely rare are commanders willing to stand in front of troops, inform 
them of “kill zones,” and then enforce those zones. General Dick Cody was one of 
those. General Ray Odierno, who served as Army Chief of Staff from 2011 to 2015, 
was another. General Odierno made it very clear ethics will be enforced and toxic 
commanders will not be tolerated. Many made the mistake of not believing the 
seriousness of Odierno’s warning. I witnessed that first-hand. When Odierno was 
commanding all U.S. Forces in Iraq, I was called back into that country to testify 
at the court martial of a battalion commander who was subsequently convicted of 
sexual misconduct, abusing subordinates, and severe mishandling of classified 
documents. Odierno never hesitated to stand by his words.  
Unfortunately, we do not have enough Codys and Odiernos throughout the 
ranks. What we do have are the vast majority of supervisors who will lie to avoid 
confrontation. Hackworth captured this problem with his previously referenced 
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“evaluations” article. The following three paragraphs from “In Search of Account-
ability” remain as true today as when I wrote them two decades ago: 
A lot of publicity is currently being directed towards the Army for letting 
down its female soldiers. The leadership of the Army has let down its fe-
male soldiers. The leadership has also let down all soldiers who want to 
ensure that the Army is a fair and honest place to serve. That same leader-
ship has long since been warned that serious problems exist that go far 
beyond sexual harassment. We treat cancer when it eats away at a body's 
ability to function. Lack of accountability is a cancer that has been eating 
away at the Army's effectiveness. Because of the involvement of Congress 
and the American press, Army leadership is running around like fire fight-
ers frantically trying to extinguish sexual harassment. Instead of trying to 
correct symptoms, they should go after the root cause. They should work 
to develop an environment that protects integrity and enforces justice. 
We can talk theory about how the system is supposed to work. However, 
the attention the Army is now receiving proves that the system is broken. 
It will never be repaired until violators of the UCMJ, no matter what rank, 
are held totally accountable. If that includes taking actions to end the ca-
reers of self-serving officers and NCOs, then so be it. We must stop under-
mining the effectiveness of the Army by protecting those who are out for 
themselves. 
The two most important missions we have between wars are to maintain 
readiness and prepare for the next conflict. We can't achieve maximum 
results when our good soldiers are either being destroyed or compromised 
by bad officers and NCOs. Furthermore, we can't expect soldiers to will-
ingly risk death in wartime when senior leadership will not stand up for 
them in peacetime. Unfortunately, too many good soldiers have been leav-
ing the ranks because of bad soldiers. These departing good soldiers will 
never become tomorrow's outstanding leaders. This loss will be felt most 
on the future battlefield. The price will be paid with the blood and lives of 
young Americans (Martin, 1998). 
As stated at the beginning of this article, warriors despise paying for the same 
real-estate twice. That is exactly what is happening, and will continue to happen, 
until leaders at all levels have the dedication and commitment to do what is ex-
pected of them in the first place. As mentioned earlier, “Consideration of Others” 
and “Army Values” are nice, but there is nothing in either that is not already cov-
ered in basic leadership. Unfortunately, the West Point Prayer, calling for the 
harder right over the easier wrong, is too frequently ignored in the field for the sake 
of self-interest and lack of ambition. 
A balance of justice must be achieved, both for the victims and the falsely ac-
cused. When the system is as broken as it currently is, lives of innocent people can 
easily be permanently destroyed. That, in turn, has a domino effect. In my own 
situation, had I not corrected the career damage directed toward me for having 
defended cadets and staff members from abuse while assigned to Cadet Command, 
I would not have been available to later serve as the senior Antiterrorism/Force 
Protection Officer for all Coalition Forces in Iraq (2003-2004). I would not have 
been on the streets of Najaf with Police Chief Aziz, to identify and close the vulner-
abilities for the pending Ashara celebrations. The Al Qaeda plot to kill the moderate 
16




Grand Ayatollah Sistani, discovered by U.S. military intelligence, would have suc-
ceeded. Iraq would have erupted into immediate civil war and tens of thousands of 
people would have been killed.  
Three units of Cobalt 60 radioactive devices were stolen (later recovered) at 
Habbaniyah Testing Site in Iraq. In order to appoint an officer to conduct the in-
vestigation, Lieutenant General Sanchez personally reviewed all the files of his 
colonels to determine who had a radiological security background. I was the only 
one. After identifying the causes of the security problem and without waiting for 
authorization from General Sanchez, I went to Al Tuwaitha and exposed an iden-
tical situation there. Armed with information previously denied to him, the on-site 
battalion commander implemented the corrective actions. Had I not taken imme-
diate action, rebel cleric Moqtada Sadr’s militia would have had easy access a thou-
sand units of Cobalt 60. That would have made a lot of dirty bombs and stay-be-
hind devices. The War on Terrorism would have taken a very dark turn. Sanchez 
was always appreciative for my not taking the typical staff officer approach and 
waiting to be scheduled for a meeting to ask his permission to implement what 
obviously needed to be done.  
The security vulnerabilities I exposed at the Baghdad Trade Fair provided Am-
bassador Bremer the justification he needed to close the event. Hundreds of people 
would have been slaughtered there. A pre-positioned bomb planted at the Bagh-
dad’s doctors’ convention killed no one, because days earlier I had successfully 
fought to have the meeting location moved to a building inside the Green Zone, 
secured by a company of the 82nd Airborne.  
ONE LIFE TOUCHES MANY,  
PROVIDING IT SURVIVES IN THE FIRST PLACE 
Like George Bailey in “It’s A Wonderful Life,” (Liberty Films, 1946) one life 
touches many in unexpected ways. Mine was just one life. As covered in my “In 
Search of Accountability,” destruction of dedicated soldiers will result in critical 
human assets being unavailable when later needed.  
I fought against sexual harassment and abuse of authority on three fronts: in-
side a dysfunctional Cadet Command environment; against senior Army leader-
ship while my more immediate commanders were nipping at my heels; and on be-
half of the soldiers of my six commands. I know success can be achieved. The 
fighting against denial and cover-ups by senior Army leadership has been won. The 
E Ring of the Pentagon got the message a generation ago. Generals like Cody and 
Odierno rose to the top and became the champions of that fight. The Pentagon’s 
continuing willingness to take down general grade officers comes as proof the suc-
cess of that fight remains solid. 
What is now having to be fought again is the rebuilding of Frank Serpico’s en-
vironment where the dishonest fear the honest, and not the other way around. 
Hackworth was right when he stated the only lives you can be guaranteed to posi-
tively effect on a continual and permanent basis are those of the people assigned 
to your commands. Troops at all levels need to understand what is unacceptable. 
Innocent troops need to know they have a champion at local command levels will-
ing to fight for them and for their dignity.  
Announcing “kill zones” was definitely politically incorrect, especially consid-
ering I was doing it in the 1990s. That stated, good troops never had a problem 
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with those zones. To them I was announcing zones in which they knew they would 
be protected. It wasn’t the announcing of the “kill zones” that brought an end to 
sexual harassment and other problems in my commands – it was enforcement. 
Changing the mindsets of problematic people produces rare achievements. Behav-
ior modification is much more achievable. When a command’s behavior changes 
long enough, the entire command climate will then change – all the way up the 
ranks.  
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of Defense major commands. He is also a retired Member of Technical Staff at Department 
of Energy’s Sandia National Laboratories. While at Sandia he came through the ranks as a 
member of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) force, Protective Force Lieutenant, 
Operations Security Program Manager, and served as Operations Chief of the Laboratory’s 
Security Force. Colonel Martin earned his Bachelors’ degree from Northeast Missouri State 
University (Law Enforcement and Corrections) and earned two Masters’ Degrees 
(International Politics and International Business) from Webster University. He has 
testified numerous times before the U.S. Congress and parliaments of Canada, Great 
Britain, and European Union. Colonel Martin has scores of published articles focusing on 
leadership, military history, Europe, Middle-East, and Africa.  
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